Do goals stimulate goals?

By Matthias Kullowatz (@MattyAnselmo)

I've heard it said before that a soccer team is most vulnerable after a goal has been scored. My coaches often said this, anyway. Perhaps it was just to keep us focused after we'd experienced the euphoria of scoring or the letdown of conceding. It turns out, there is some support for this notion from the 2014 MLS season. To the results! 

1) A goal is more likely to be scored in a five-minute segment if a goal was just scored during the last five-minute segment.

First, I should say that I controlled for the teams' abilities using season expected goals data, and I controlled for the gamestate as well, since there are fewer goals typically scored in zero gamestates. Once controls were in place, I found that if a goal had been scored by either team in last five-minute segment, the chances of another goal being scored in the next five-minute segment increased from about 15% to nearly 18%.  Put another way, after a recent goal the average goals scored in next five-minute segment increased by nearly 0.04, equivalent to about 0.70 goals over a whole game.

This isn't an obvious uptick in scoring. You probably wouldn't notice even if you watched a lot of games, but the effects of a recent goal are also not nothing. The game appears to open up a bit on average after a recent goal. 

2) The team that most recently scored is more likely to score again (than its typical scoring rate would suggest).

Breaking the first hypothesis down further, we actually see that the team most likely to score in the next five-minute segment is the team that just scored.* The chances of a team scoring in the next five minutes--whether it be the away team or the home team--are increased by 3 or 4 percent if that team scored recently. Chances increase from 6% to 9% for the away team and from 9% to 13% for the home team.

Typical sports fans may say "duh" because the existence of momentum in sports is a common belief. However, momentum is still very much a point of controversy among statisticians across all sports. I would say about the only thing we agree on is that the effects of psychological momentum are smaller than the common fan would believe, and perhaps even negligible in many scenarios. That's why this finding surprised me, especially when we consider that the team that just scored must then relinquish possession.

These results may not apply to a youth soccer team, or even a professional team from another league. But in MLS, there is an average effect on scoring, which is not necessarily negligible, that comes from a recent goal being scored.

Comments are welcome, especially if you can think of a way to further control the scenarios and weed out any biases in the observational data.

*Of course, the team that just scored is probably the better team. But that's why a control was put in place for overall team ability. What isn't controlled for is team ability on that day (due to injuries and what not).

Drew and Harrison on the Last Word Soccer Club Podcast

Here's our ASA plug for the week; go check out Last Word Soccer Club's 2014 year in review podcast from last night. Drew and Harrison went on and talked everything from the World Cup to MLS Cup, and most things in between. Go give it a listen!

A Best XI Of Possible Expansion Draft Targets

By Harrison Crow (@harrison_crow)

This started as a suggestion from twitter to make a team built from players left exposed in the expansion draft. I'll be honest, as much as I love writing these sort of things and doing the research; I'm rather terrible at these kind of things. My opinions are not often in line with teams and professional analysts that at this point I kind of figured I'd save myself the embarrassment and keep what little dignity I had.

I look at just two metrics (expected goals and duels won) coupled with the player's salary to make my decision using SBNation's mock expansion protection list, found here, to determine whether that player would be available or not. The bottom line here is simple, create a starting line-up that could conceivably make a run for the playoffs and abiding by the rules of the MLS expansion draft (e.g. not drafting multiple players off the same team). Insane? Can't be done? A complete waste of time? Probably all the above.

All the basics should be covered and anything else I'll mention on the fly. Let's get started.

GOALKEEPER  (~$49,000 spent)

Jeff Attinella, Real Salt Lake, Goalkeeper - $48,825

We don't have a ton of data on Attinella, but the best things to know are the following three: 1) he's cheap, 2) at 26 he's also young(ish), and third, with the two years of data and 82 total attempted shots against him, our expected goal model has seen him perform 4.50 goals better than the average keeper. He may not be the sexy pick considering that there are three or four more experienced keepers, but he's the most interesting from an advanced data/economic stand point.

DEFENDERS (~$380,000 spent)

Jair Beneitz, FC Dallas, Left Back - $97,875
I feel like Beneitz gets overlooked despite his ability for two reasons. First, Michele. Second, because he's not an overly athletic athlete and those players for tend to be overlooked in general. He's the top expected goals creator (0.19, per 90 mins) from a back line position and the top duel winners (8.18, per 90 mins). He may be the biggest no brainier of this whole process.

Jalil Anibaba, Seattle Sounders, Central Defender $159,620
David Horst, Houston Dynamo, Central Defender - $72,750
I choose both Anibaba and Horst as a team. Anibaba is a good possession/passer out of the back line and that shows from his .11 expected goals per 90. A long with that Horst is an awesome ball winner in central defense with over 6 duels won per 90.

If I learned much about central defending in the past year, it's this: you have to have a tag team with qualities that balance each other out. The two might not be enough win an MLS Cup but together should be enough to get you to the playoff spot.

Also, there wasn't much depth here... the pickings were slim.
 

Alvas Powell, Portland Timbers, Right Back - $48,828 (Drew's note: Sorry dude, there is a 100% chance that the Timbers protect him)

Okay, I cheated a tiny tiny bit on this selection. He was covered by the original mock expansion draft protection list submitted by Stumptown footy. However he was the last one chosen for on the roster and since the team just traded for Nat Borchers I feel that bumps him from the list and makes him a candidate here. Which is great because decent defensive depth pertaining to MLS is thin let a lone the bottom of the rosters.

The Jamaican is a poor man's DeAndre Yedlin in some ways. Young (only 20 years old), lots of speed down the right wing but also seems very capable to use his gifts to track down the ball and regaining possession (7 duels won per 90 minutes). But he also has the highest expected goal creation (.21 expected goals per 90 minutes) marks outside on the list. It was Benetiz before I cheated. But now... yeah. Exceptional young talent for the future.

MIDFIELDERS (~$384,000 spent)

Soony Saad, Sporting Kansas City, Left Midfielder - $51,500
Kansas City has a bit of attacking talent on the roster that won't all be protected. I really was drooling all over the nearly 9 duels won per 90 minutes by CJ Sapong but the fact is that he costs nearly twice as much as Saad ($112,000 vs $51,500)  and creates less on the attacking end (.33 compared to Saad's .39 expected goals created per 90 minutes).

Leo Fernandes, Philadelphia Union, Central Midfielder - $120,000
With exception to the one guy that I love, who also hasn't yet been mentioned, I wonder if Fernandes could be the steal of the draft for me. Fernandez was marvelous in the matches I watched.  His goal creation numbers (0.61  expected goals per 90 minutes) are very similar to Javier Morales (.56) and Brad Davis (.54) within the same filter. The biggest problem here is that it's an extremely small size of just under 1,000 minutes over two years. He could flop, he could blow away the league. Oh, he also averages over 5.68 duels won per 90 minutes. Which is also really good.

Khari Stephenson, San Jose Earthquakes,  Central Midfielder - $68,336
He's a veteran and while that kind of label draws tons of yawns and eye rolls there is something to having experience. He uses his speed to win balls, 5 duels per 90 minutes, and can aid the attack with .23 expected goals created per 90. Sure, kill me over this pick if you want. There aren't a lot of  central midfielder that are the right blend of xGoals, Duels and still cheap. He's the best bang for your buck here.

Sebastian Fernandez, Vancouver Whitecaps, Right Midfielder - $143,000
I liked Fernandez this past season. I liked him more when he came out of the midfield than at striker as he didn't seem to be the "scoring" type. He averages roughly .30 expected goals per 90 minutes and while that's okay you need more (really, a lot more) out of your striker. Though the near six duels won per 90 is really nice.

FORWARD (~$228,000 spent)

Patrick Mullins, New England Revolution, Midfielder/Forward - $100,000
Not sure if you've seen my tweet coverage in the build up to MLS Cup, but it's pretty much had bits of Mullins through out it. I can't get enough of this guy and while I was mostly on the fence about whether he could be a legit starter in this league, his performance in the MLS Cup pushed me over the line. I think Mullins is probably the best available player in this draft and he's my #1 overall pick here. .49 expected goals per 90 (just a touch higher than Lee Nguyen) and 5.56 duels won per 90 both lead the Revolution for individuals that saw more than 1,000 minutes on the pitch.

Luke Moore, Toronto FC, Forward - $128,000
True story, Luke Moore collected more expected goals (13.45) than the following:

Jermaine Defoe (13.14)
Quincy Amariwka (12.67)
Joao Plata (12.24)
Fabian Castillo (11.79)

Moore was one of the few reasons I thought Chivas could pin ball through some teams and cause some chaos by just playing a brand of wrecking ball. I was excited that they went after someone outside of their "brand" and was hardly disappointed when they traded him to Toronto just a few months into the year. Moore also grabbed 6.6 duels won per 90, which ranked him inside the top-20 of MLS starters.

FINAL TALLY (~$1,041,000 spent)

There are a lot of really interesting players on this list that just are too big of risks and unknowns to take a chance without knowing who A) your drafting for and B) how you plan to fill out your roster beyond the expansion draft.

A prime example is Krzysztof Król (Montreal Impact) who played 961 minutes produced .41 expected goals and won a little over 5 duels per 90 minutes. All solid numbers but I went with Horst because he's cheaper (kind of the point of this thing) and but also a more established commodity.

Also, you could have Jalil Anibaba easily enough because he's out of contract with Seattle. But trying to go into that much detail here defeats the purpose and really makes this whole process a bit more difficult than needed. I drafted because he's listed as available and he suits what I feel is the need in the situation.

Any thoughts or feed back on players you liked or wished I had mentioned? Leave your comments down below.

An ASA MLS Cup Preview

By Harrison Crow (@harrison_crow)

Here we are, the final match of the 2014 season. The MLS Cup, a game for the whooooooole enchilada, the whoooooole ball of wax, aaaaaaaall the marbles. Okay, let's end my John Candy moment and press with the real stuff.

It's been a long, fun and strange season when you look back on it. One club produced possibly the most dominating statistical season ever in MLS history. And here they stand at the last point in the season to bring home a trophy. The other team is one of the younger and more energetic clubs in MLS playing fun, attacking soccer. They are a band of lesser appreciated talents wearing a chip on their shoulder and seeking to prove themselves, led by Lee Nguyen.

TEAM	xGoals For	xGoals Against	xGoalDifference	xGoal Even Difference	Duels*
LA Galaxy	62.9	32.98	29.92	18.02	1534
New England	47.26	46.92	0.34	-3.74	1529

As you can see above, the LA Galaxy stand out far above any competition in the league. The Seattle Sounders are probably their closest competitor, and with them being dispatched in the Western Conference Finals, this becomes their cup to lose.

Most handicappers generally 'gift' the home club a half a goal going into the match, added to the top of what we would expect from their goal scoring talents. The LA Galaxy and their outrageous scoring ability and tremendous defense have a clear advantage in this situation because of those details.

That said, you're talking about what was a top-5 MLS defense last season, and one that held it's entire line together. While it's had its faults this season in terms of allowing opportunities, we've seen some very strong games from them that it wouldn't be outside the realm of possibility to keep LA off the board, or perhaps to allow a single goal in this match.

Right now our projection system has LA Galaxy as just over a 75% favorite to beat the New England Revolution. A very huge gap that is reflective of their season accomplishments.

Let's dig a bit deeper into these teams.

New England Revolution

#	POS	Player	Age	HT	WT	Min.	xG	xG/90	Duels Won	DW/90	Salary
13	M	Jermaine Jones	33	6'	170	613	1.49	0.22	57	8.37	$ 3,252,500.00
27	F	Jerry Bengtson	27	6' 1"	165	238	1.21	0.46	17	6.43	$    144,000.00
39	F	Geoffrey Castillion	23	6' 3"	170	14	0	0.00	1	6.43	$    329,033.00
11	M	Kelyn Rowe	22	5' 8"	150	1960	8.14	0.37	138	6.34	$    181,000.00
23	D	Jose Goncalves	29	6' 2"	180	2381	1.63	0.06	151	5.71	$    479,375.00
10	F	Teal Bunbury	24	6' 2"	185	2446	8.23	0.30	154	5.67	$    233,000.00
7	F	Patrick Mullins	22	6' 1"	175	1198	6.5	0.49	75	5.63	$    100,000.00
24	M	Lee Nguyen	28	5' 8"	150	2750	14.59	0.48	170	5.56	$    193,750.00
2	D	Andrew Farrell	22	5' 11"	185	2840	1.96	0.06	150	4.75	$    176,000.00
30	D	Kevin Alston	26	5' 9"	160	683	0.98	0.13	35	4.61	$    143,333.00
6	M	Scott Caldwell	23	5' 8"	150	1553	1.08	0.06	76	4.40	$      59,813.00
12	M	Andy Dorman	32	6' 1"	160	1237	1.07	0.08	59	4.29	$    135,000.00
5	D	A.J. Soares	25	6'	170	2806	2.68	0.09	118	3.78	$    159,180.00
25	D	Darrius Barnes	27	6' 1"	175	1628	2.15	0.12	67	3.70	$      86,666.00
16	M	Daigo Kobayashi	31	5' 10"	155	1867	3.49	0.17	74	3.57	$    136,666.00
4	M/F	Steve Neumann	23	6'	165	538	1.97	0.33	21	3.51	$      86,250.00
8	D/M	Chris Tierney	28	6'	170	1930	6.28	0.29	69	3.22	$    103,333.00
15	D	Stephen McCarthy	26	6' 5"	190	90	0	0.00	3	3.00	$    132,582.00
9	F	Charlie Davies	28	5' 10"	160	1143	4.39	0.35	37	2.91	$      78,940.00
92	F	Dimitry Imbongo	24	6'	160	32	0	0.00	1	2.81	$    122,375.00
14	M	Diego Fagundez	19	5' 8"	140	2142	9.45	0.40	55	2.31	$    137,200.00
33	M	Donnie Smith	23	5' 11"	160	45	0	0.00	1	2.00	$      36,500.00
17	F	Andre Akpan	26	6'		0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$      51,333.00
40	GK	Larry Jackson	24	6' 1"	180	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$      36,504.00
21	M	Shalrie Joseph	36	6' 3"	195	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$    294,000.00
44	D	Jossimar Sanchez	23	5' 9"	170	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$      36,504.00
36	GK	Luis Soffner	24	6' 4"	210	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$      36,500.00
19	M	Alec Sundly	22	6'	170	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	$      36,504.00
99	F	Tony Taylor	25	6'	170	9	0	0.00	0	0.00	$      79,371.00

It kind of feels like this whole team's attack, and possibly its existence to this point in the season, is based upon Lee Nguyen. It is... but then again, maybe not. Nguyen has turned into something beyond what the Revolution could have possibly imagined him being this season. and timely goals have had a lot to do with the Revolution's success. His 14.59 total expected goals (xGoals + xAssists) over the season indicates his imperative role in the Revolution's attack.

However, while many people want to wave the flag of Nguyen, the reality of the situation is that he doesn't rank in the top-10 in terms of creating scoring chances, that according to our shot metrics.

Nguyen has been the team leader, and as mentioned, scored some mighty crucial goals. That being said he hasn't been entirely alone, and had some help from key pieces a long the way.

An interesting story line for me is that which concerns Diego Fagundez. The narrative seems to be that he's regressed in terms of goal scoring and assists ability, and that this season was a step back overall. Yes, that is true, but Fagundez is still probably the second most dangerous piece in the Revolution arsenal. He's produced a fair share of scoring chances for the attack and finished second behind Nguyen in total expected goals created for the Revolution. 

The thing is, as Drew mentioned on the podcast, Fagundez didn't make an appearance in the Eastern Conference finals. Instead Jay Heaps chose to go the direction of Kelyn Rowe in the first leg and then Chris Tierney in the second for his defensive prowess and ability to mark out the Red Bull's Lloyd Sam. The question going into this weekend is how will Heaps negotiate the situation with what is likely New England's second best attacker on the bench, and needing to score goals against the best defense in MLS.

The problem isn't just slowing down the mighty Empire's fleet of Zardes, Keane and Donovan. It's the in the ability to produce goals too. Omar Gonzalez and AJ DeLaGarza are two of the most dominate centerback pairings in MLS, and even if Bruce Arena decides to push AJ out wide to a full back spot, Tommy Meyer or Leonardo both provide a superior ability to win duels and limit shots at the keeper.

If the Revolution want to win, they're obviously going to have to find a way to outscore the Galaxy. Duh, right? Well, that doesn't necessarily just start with their attack, which is potent enough, the responsibility for winning this game is going to have to lie with their defense to produce a gem of a performance.

LA Galaxy

#	POS	Player	Age	HT	WT	Min.	xG	xG/90	Duels Won	D/90	Salary
19	M	Juninho	25	5' 7"	145	2758	4.83	0.16	141	4.60	$    325,000.00
10	F	Landon Donovan	32	5' 8"	155	2720	20.66	0.68	109	3.61	$    260,000.00
7	F	Robbie Keane	34	5' 9"	160	2549	25.93	0.92	88	3.11	$ 4,500,000.00
20	D	A.J. DeLaGarza	27	5' 9"	150	2491	0.92	0.03	76	2.75	$    155,000.00
33	D	Dan Gargan	31	5' 11"	175	2400	2.97	0.11	116	4.35	$      48,500.00
11	F	Gyasi Zardes	23	6' 2"	175	2392	14.91	0.56	142	5.34	$    198,000.00
8	M	Marcelo Sarvas	33	5' 10"	155	2218	5.78	0.23	125	5.07	$    192,500.00
6	M	Baggio Husidic	27	6' 1"	172	2197	6.91	0.28	109	4.47	$      90,000.00
4	D	Omar Gonzalez	26	6' 5"	205	1902	2.65	0.13	120	5.68	$ 1,250,000.00
24	M	Stefan Ishizaki	32	5' 11"	165	1898	8.26	0.39	88	4.17	$    213,000.00
22	D	Leonardo	26	6' 2"	185	1837	0.51	0.02	95	4.65	$    105,000.00
14	M	Robbie Rogers	27	5' 10"	165	1372	2.71	0.18	103	6.76	$    167,500.00
21	D	Tommy Meyer	24	6' 2"	175	926	0.26	0.03	47	4.57	$      64,598.00
9	F	Alan Gordon	33	6' 1"	190	511	7.16	1.26	50	8.81	$    206,666.00
16	F	Rob Friend	33	6' 5"	205	376	2.22	0.53	70	16.76	$      91,000.00
2	D	Todd Dunivant	33	6'	175	370	0.37	0.09	11	2.68	$    160,750.00
34	M	Kenney Walker	25	5' 9"	170	329	0.36	0.10	17	4.65	$      48,825.00
26	D	James Riley	32	5' 10"	150	254	0.17	0.06	12	4.25	$      80,000.00
30	F	Chandler Hoffman	24	6'	160	61	0.8	1.18	3	4.43	$      48,500.00
40	F	Raul Mendiola	20	5' 8"	150	57	0.27	0.43	2	3.16	$      36,500.00
38	F	Bradford Jamieson IV	18	6' 1"	165	23	0.08	0.31	2	7.83	$      36,500.00
5	F	Jose Villarreal	21	5' 8"	160	19	0.16	0.76	5	23.68	$      50,700.00
25	M	Rafael Garcia	25	5' 6"	150	16	0.09	0.51	1	5.63	$      48,825.00
36	D	Oscar Sorto	20	5' 8"	155	15	0	0.00	2	12.00	$      50,700.00
31	D	Kyle Venter	23	6' 3"	190	0	0	0	0	0	$      61,000.00
32	F	Jack McBean	19	6'	175	0	0	0	0	0	$      48,500.00
27	F	Charlie Rugg	24	6'	175	0	0	0	0	0	$      48,500.00

It was hardly a far fetched idea that LA could return to an MLS Cup in 2014 after they bottomed out against RSL last year in Rio Tinto. Fast forward 12 months, and Robbie Keane has earned every bit of his MVP award. Not to mention the historic attacking force aided by the development of Gyasi Zardes and the resurgence of Stefan Ishizaki and Baggio Husidic. There was also this guy, Landon Donovan. Not sure if you heard of him. He was really good, too. I heard he's retiring, hopefully the league does something to honor him and what he's done for MLS.

Top to bottom, LA is the clear the favorite...mostly. While, yes, they have dominated in almost every facet of the game thus far into the season, the worrisome figure that I have is that while they don't allow a lot of shots the ones they do allow tend to be of a higher quality. Danny Page has shown that a few high quality shots are more dangerous than a lot of low quality shots.

Going into the game, with all the talk of having a dominant attack, the Galaxy do not have one player inside the top-30 for duels won. A lot of that could be due to their ability to hold possession and their high press, which creates bad passes and turnovers, rather than the need to win duels. Still it's something. Or maybe just half of a something to worry about with New England's monster in the middle.

Jermaine Jones is a beast in the midfield, and while I talked on the podcast about how he could have issues competing with both Marcelo Sarvas and Juhnino in the midfield, the truth is that he's bolstered the New England midfield with a one-man layer of protection. Since Jones signed with the Revs, the team has been 11-1-2. Through those 14 matches they allowed just 16 goals, which includes some high-scoring playoff games. Perhaps more importantly, during that same time the Revs have allowed only about one expected goal per game, a metric that means more in small sample sizes. 

The Rev's defense was pretty good last season, and while they returned all the same pieces, they've fallen away from where they we last year, allowing an additional 0.19 expected goals per game. That drop in performance is partially due to Jose Gonclaves not being the transcendent talent he was one year ago. Last season Goncalves was the team leader in duels won and made the top-10 in MLS, leading to his defender of the year award. Despite that, Goncalves has fallen away from where he was last year and it's distinguished by the fact he doesn't even lead his own team in duels won.

If the Galaxy want to win, they're going to have to continue to expose the opposing defense and play their usual dominant brand of soccer. This shouldn't be hard, playing at home. What may disrupt their dominance is New England's versatile midfield, featuring the attacking Nguyen, and the tougher, more defensive Jones.

It's the Empire's game to lose, and while that seems to slight the Revolution, it's more about the fact that LA has been one of the most dominating teams in MLS history. It's compounded by the fact that emotions are going to be running high, with it being Landon Donovan's last career match, a match in which the most decorated American soccer player is going to be looking to go out on top.

While I favor the Galaxy 3-1 in the end, my heart will be rooting the classic underdog in Lee Nguyen.*

*Drew favors the Galaxy 2 - 1, while Matthias thinks it will be 2 - 0. 

How Proactive is Your Favorite MLS Team?

By Jared Young (@JaredEYoung)

Jonathan Wilson, most notably the author of the soccer epic Inverting the Pyramid, wrote a piece  in 2012 for the Guardian called “The question: Position or Possession?”. In it, he discusses the merits of both possession and position and supposes that it’s difficult if not impossible to control both possession and position simultaneously. He cites Barcelona and their tiki-taka philosophy as a team that aspires to extreme levels of possession, while Chelsea prefers to maintain position on the pitch defensively in order to take advantage of space behind the offense.
The post got me thinking about how to measure whether or not a team was proactive in their use of the ball or reactive. I’m not convinced those are the correct terms to describe the two strategies, but I’m not sure there are two terms that define the extreme type of play adequately, primarily because I think the words mix two dimensions. The chart below illustrates the two dimensions on which a team builds its strategy.

The first is a passing dimension. On the one extreme, there is a direct passing philosophy which looks to push the ball up quickly to take advantage of space once a team gains possession. At the other end is an indirect passing philosophy which involves short passes that build possession up the field and eventually attempt break down the defense.

The other dimension is where a team begins their initial line of resistance; the pressing dimension. There are teams that give high pressure up the pitch hoping to get a turnover closer to the goal (e.g. Barcelona). There are also teams that allow opponents deeper in order to maintain defensive formation and positioning longer, and thus use a low pressure technique (e.g. Chelsea).

Teams tend to pair two ends of each dimension, so that there are two notable styles of play. Teams that press high also tend to pass more indirectly. This is mostly due to the physical demands of the high press. Teams cannot afford to take risky passes after working so hard to gain possession. Similarly, teams that sit back and offer low pressure tend to pass the ball more directly. Of course, as Wilson mentions, the best teams are able to do all of the above, and they can play any way needed based on the score of the game and what the opposition is doing.

To measure a team’s level of proactivity or reactivity we need to understand what statistics characterize games at the extremes. I located every MLS game in 2014 where one team held 65% or more of the possession. The thinking there is those are matches where one team is looking to cede possession and one team is looking to control possession. These possession levels are not necessarily due to dominant performances, but rather games where extreme tactics are carried out.
I deleted games that were decided by 2+ goals or more. The rationale there is game state can dramatically shift a team’s strategic intent during the course of the game. Closer games are more likely to have teams consistently employ their original strategic intent.

There were 16 such games played in MLS in 2014. Here is a breakdown the statistical results of the games. The team with higher possession is considered the proactive team and the team with lower possession is the reactive team. The average possession for the proactive teams is 68%.
Here are shooting results between the two styles of play.

Style	Shots Per Game	Finishing Rate (%)	Shots on Target (%)
Proactive	16.8	4.9	29.9
Reactive	9.2	12.2	44.9

Proactive teams shoot twice as often as reactive teams,  but they get fewer of those shots on target and score less frequently. This is because reactive teams are keeping their defensive shape and pressuring much closer to their goal, making it more difficult for the opponent's offense to get shots to the target or convert them.

There are similar differences in regards to passing.

Style	Passes	% of passes in final 3rd that were crosses	% Long Passes (25+ yds)	Pass Completion %
Proactive	530	18%	13%	83%
Reactive	259	13%	21%	68%

Extremely proactive teams average 530 passes per match, while extremely reactive teams average 259. The ratio of passes in the final third also holds up consistently, 152 to 86. However, the types of passes made by each team has some notable differences.

Proactive teams use 5% more of their passes in the final third on crosses. If defenses are truly keeping their compact shape, then offenses generally work the ball out wide to the available space.  More crosses make sense. Reactive teams strike 8% more of their passes 25 yards or longer (for our purposes, 25+ yard passes are called “long passes”). This is an indication of direct play. The longer passes leads to a lower completion rate. Don’t be fooled by the lower overall pass completion rate of reactive teams; the completion rate difference is due to risk-taking when they have possession. More direct passing comes with more risk as the passes are longer and are generally to players who are on the move. Proactive teams complete 15% more passes than their reactive counterparts.

While this analysis certainly isn't comprehensive or perfect, I do believe it allows accurate insight into how teams would operate at the extreme ends of the strategic spectrum.

Proactive Score

The goal is to develop a simple score that shows fans and analysts where on the spectrum a given team plays. To do that, I started with the variables that had the most spread in the analysis above. I didn't look at shooting statistics, as those measure an outcome of the style of play, not the style of play itself. The two strongest differences were total number of passes and long pass percentage. Of minor comfort is that a multivariate regression including total passes attempted, long passes attempted, and a home/away flag were all statistically significant in predicting possession of MLS teams at the game level with an Rsquared value of 70%.

That said, using passes to identify large spreads in possession is nothing short of obvious. But without Opta data, there are limited choices for fans to use to determine a team’s strategic intent.
After trying a combination of descriptive metrics and looking at the corresponding spread of results, I landed on using total passes attempted and two times long passes to create a score. While multiplying long passes times two adds complication to the formula, the larger spread does create more separation in the target metrics.

From there I scored a team’s performance on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being an extremely proactive team. The result when looking at the games in 2014 is a reasonably normal bell shaped curve.

The metrics that result from the modeled Proactive Score don't have as much spread as the small sample of 16 games at the extremes, but the model rank orders in line with the sample. In short, It isn't distributed as perfectly as our smaller sample size, but the trends remain

Pscore	SOG/Shots	Home Possession	Pass Completion %	Finishing %	Opp. Finishing %
7	35%	63%	85%	11%	13%
6	37%	59%	84%	10%	12%
5	36%	57%	81%	11%	11%
4	34%	51%	80%	11%	11%
3	40%	48%	78%	14%	11%
2	39%	46%	74%	12%	7%
1	43%	39%	69%	15%	10%

Proactive teams have more trouble finding the target due to the reactive team's defensive positioning and density around the goal. Reactive teams get more shots on target because they are taking their shots with more open space between the shooter and the goal, and are more likely to be on a breakaway. Shooting percentage for all teams is correlated with the shooting percentages in our smaller sample of the 16 lopsided possession games, though proactive teams shoot much better than the initial sample indicated. This could be because I chose to only look at close games which may indicate unlucky shooting by the proactive teams.

So what can this Proactive Score tell us about the 2014 MLS season? Here is a table of each team and their score on both the road and at home. Playoff teams are in color – orange if they were proactive, red if they were reactive.

Team	Total Pscore	Away Pscore	Away PPG	Home Pscore	Home PPG
LA Galaxy	4.9	4.3	1.2	5.6	2.3
Columbus	4.7	4.5	1.2	4.9	1.8
Seattle	4.7	4.3	1.6	5.2	2.2
Real Salt Lake	4.6	4.4	1.1	4.8	2.2
New York	4.4	4.1	0.9	4.6	2.0
Sporting KC	3.9	3.3	1.6	4.5	1.4
Vancouver	3.8	3.2	1.1	4.4	1.9
Portland	3.8	3.4	1.6	4.1	1.4
Houston	3.7	3.5	0.6	3.8	1.6
Colorado	3.6	3.6	0.5	3.5	1.4
San Jose	3.5	3.1	0.4	3.9	1.2
Toronto FC	3.5	3.4	1.1	3.6	1.4
Philadelphia	3.5	3.3	0.8	3.8	1.5
D.C. United	3.4	3.0	1.3	3.8	2.1
Montreal	3.3	3.0	0.3	3.6	1.3
FC Dallas	2.9	2.7	1.0	3.1	2.3
New England	2.8	2.3	1.3	3.4	1.9
Chicago	2.8	2.5	0.8	3.1	1.4
Chivas USA	2.7	2.1	0.8	3.3	1.3

A couple of things jump out. The first is that the seven most proactive teams all made the playoffs. Then there is a fairly noticeable gap before more playoff teams are found.  Only three reactive teams made the playoffs; the New England Revolution, FC Dallas and D.C. United.

Next, we can test the theory that the reactive teams were indeed reactive. A plot of shots taken by finishing rate will indicate if the reactive teams took less shots but finished at a higher level. The orange dots indicate proactive teams that made the playoffs. The red dots indicate the three reactive teams. Blue dots represent non-playoff teams.

Both FC Dallas and D.C. United show the shooting results of a reactive team. They ranked 17th and 18th in the league in shots taken but were 1st and 2nd in the league in finishing rate. Unlike the other two reactive teams, New England is in the middle of the pack from a shooting perspective. This is peculiar given the Revolution were the most reactive team that made the playoffs. More work would need to be done to understand the secret to the Revolution’s success from a number’s perspective. They attempted fewer passes with a higher percentage of long passes than other playoff teams, but were able to attempt an above average number of shots and finish them at an average rate. They were also slightly better than average defensively.

According to Jonathan Wilson, reactive teams prefer position to possession with a primary goal of keeping defensive position. The three reactive teams that made the playoffs were all ranked in the top eight in the league in fewest goals allowed, with D.C. United tying the L.A Galaxy for best in MLS.
Measuring a team’s tactical intent has a long way to go, and this is a very humble initial look. More detailed Opta data would allow for much deeper understanding of a team’s choice between possession and position. The importance of putting a measurable number to these tactics is so other statistics can be understood relative to that context. If we can understand what makes one reactive team successful while another fails, we can better understand the effectiveness of home and away strategies, in-game adjustments, and why (or why not) teams are successful.

My nagging issue with DC United and their Coach of the Year

By Harrison Crow (@Harrison_Crow)

I hate crapping all over off-season awards. Really, I do. The idea of me telling you the way MLS and voters determined something is wrong and/or different than how I would determine it, even though I have zero inside track on how any of them really defined the measurables of the award (outside of the vote conducted). It's all stupid. This is just the subjective nature of the award process.

Now that you know that little bit about me, let me now show you that I'm also a hypocrite as I do exactly the opposite here in talking about how the Coach of the Year award was distributed.

Ben Olsen is probably a pretty good coach, I don't know for certain. I don't know how to measure the set of instructions that he gives prior to the game or his half time adjustments relative to his counter parts. I don't know who he really wanted for his team in the last off-season and who he fought to acquire to give the United the best chance to compete.

What I know is very simple and logical; no one really knows any of that stuff. What happened in those important conversations and the metrics that we use to "quantify" the events are laden with noise.

It's subjective, and probably a bit bias, to think that Óscar Pareja or Greg Berhalter or Sigi Schmid deserved the coach of the year any more than Olsen. We are gauging the coaches accomplishments off the accomplishments of the players. Which means the teams talent level has an associated level of value in the determining how successful the coach was. Which seems a bit unsavory.

My counter point to this; if talent wasn't involved than why wouldn't we be talking about Wilmer Cabrera and the job he did as the proverbial caretaker for the club formerly known as Chivas USA?

Assuming that talent and accomplishment within the team isn't a real stretch for determining how those that voted applied some weight of value. We understand that Olsen helped usher his team towards the first place finish in the East and the end of season results convey importance to people.

The problem that I have is that I feel this result was a very luck driven.

Much of the praise for Olsen lies with the defense that tied for the fewest goals against in MLS. The problem that I have with that is that has more to do with their keeper and luck than it has to do with actual ability and "stalwartness". Overall DC by our measures of expected goals DC United had a pretty average defensive season finishing 13th overall with 1.43 expected goals against. Some people could be even a bit harsh and say it was a sub-par season.

The difference between them having 49 goals against versus the 37 that were actually scored can mostly be attributed to the outstanding play by Bill Hamid. I'm sure there are other factors that I'm missing here but considering that Bill Hamid was good for saving almost 11 goals above the average keeper (best in MLS) it speaks to the situation of the defense possibly being less than they really appear.

And if it wasn't for the run of luck with the defense their attack was paltry at best. Their expected goals scored was second worst (only to Chivas USA) for the second year in a row. This drove their expected goal differential from being 15 to being -10. A total 25 goal swing on the basis of luck and the development of one of the best young goal keepers in MLS.

I'm sure there are situations and arguments against Berhalter, Pareja and Schmid. But handing out this award is a reminder that the awards season is about narratives. Worst to First sticks out in everyone's mind and that's alright.

I'm not saying Olsen didn't deserve the award because his team in reality sucked. I'm saying the basis for which it appears most determined  his worthiness for the award may have come by way of a false premise. Olsen may very well have deserved the award based upon the merit of his skill, effort and dedication. But pinning it on his ability to "coach" defense and then backing it up by showing they allowed the least goals in the league seems hardly tenable to me.

Honestly, if you ask me, the league's BEST coach wasn't even on the ballot. I'm not even a Galaxy fan and I think that.

How Luck Integrates With Shots And Our Expected Goal Model

By Harrison Crow (@harrison_crow)

Let's talk shots and luck.

It's obvious that shots become goals by way of two distinct systems of measurement. First quality and then quantity. The better look you get and the frequency at which you take the chance to score implies the amount goals you might score.

This is the very premise by which we created our expected goals model. We've identified certain factors that we've found to create favorable shots. Likewise how often that type of quality shot would reasonable end in a goal.

Now the problem comes with things that we cannot account for in those factors of quality such as defender and keeper placement. A keeper being out of position would obviously improve the quality of the attempted chance and a defender in the right position would lower the quality.

Luck is inevitably part of the system that is active in quantity. Alan Gordon took a very high probability shot against Stefen Frei in the closing seconds of the Galaxy-Sounder match on Sunday evening. He used his most common foot, he took it from close range and he had a large percentage of the goal exposed to him. However, a bad touch created the time necessary for Chad Marshall to get into range to block the shot.

The likelihood of that opportunity becoming a goal is weighted by other scenarios in past instances of other attacks in similar situations and factors. Would Robbie Keane have had so many issues with that shot? How about Landon Donovan or Gyasi Zardes or even any other striker?

The gap between the elite and the good and the average has shown to be much smaller than most would think. Looking at our expected goal table you can see the "G -xG" category which is simply the amount of goals scored subtracted by the amount of expected goals with the variation between the two being around .02 probability per shot. Again, this is not a lot.

Past performance patterns show us G-xG is not necessarily a predictable skill. Eddie Johnson is a great example. With +4 goals in 2012, +1 in 2013 and -1 this year. Keane, a player I think most, if not all, would consider elite within MLS, has shown the same tendencies with 0 G-xG in 2012, +5 in 2013, +2 in 2014. MVP Candidate, Lee Nguyen, posted a -2 G-xG last year and this year is near +9 goals. This is a huge swing and cannot simple be about a jump in a players ability but more about skill WITH luck. We'll get more into this when we talk Jairo Arrieta in the coming days.

This isn't to say that I don't think that skill plays a role. It's obvious fair to say Gordon isn't at the same talent level as Keane, Zardes or Donovan. But that doesn't mean that Gordon is void of talent. I'm not going to say Gordon would make that shot 50 times out of 100. But I wouldn't say that about Keane either. I think there is an edge in Keane's favor, I just believe that edge to be much smaller than most.

It's reasonable to think that luck played a huge part of Gordon not scoring on that shot. I think it's also reasonable to consider this event when evaluating the end game scoreline from either teams perspective. Gordon was in great position to change the game state from a high probability shot. Accounting for that through expected goals gives us insight to how the the striker performed.

These are some things to consider when weighing luck and it's influences on a team's results in scoring goals and allowing them. 

Akindele, Shipp and the Rookie of the Year

By Harrison Crow (@harrison_crow)

Yesterday, FC Dallas forward Tesho Akindele was named MLS Rookie-of-the-Year for 2014. Major League Soccer made the announcement on their website and I'm sure pictures of him holding the cool trophy will be forth coming. The award comes on the heel of an awesome campaign for the award. But I also hold a special plece in my heart for any Napoleon Dynamite references.

My commentary and how I usually set these things up goes some a long the lines of "having a big problem". I'm not trying to troll you with Peg + Cat references but the commentary here that follows the award presents the idea that Akindele deserves this more because of how he performed towards the end of the season compared to his competition of Harry Shipp.

The narrative goes something like this: "Shipp just faded down the stretch of the season and simply wasn't accustomed to the long hard season and Akindele only got better". Now based upon quantity/quality there maybe a legitimate argument to take place in favor of Shipp and he performed at the beginning of the season. But, Dallas was really good at the end of the season and Akindele had something to do with that. The thing is, where was Akindele in May? In June? He was mostly a rotational piece which leaves the question of does the time frame of accumulated production important?

There is less leverage and a smaller probability impact concerning the playoff seeding early in the season. It would make sense that as the season progresses certain games will hold a greater importance to the final standings. The thing is I believe that once the season concludes you should evaluate the season performance as a whole. Slumps at the early stages of this season are sadly why the Union didn't make the playoffs and why the Red Bulls missed out on top-3 seed.

This goes hand in hand with evaluating players like Shipp who had a significant influence in helping Chicago tread water. They were not a good team and Shipp didn't have a lot of help. Their home goal differential was all of plus 2, tied for the four worst in all of MLS.

By June 1st Shipp had nearly logged 1,000 minutes (894) and placed 14th in total minutes (and within 90 minutes of the four in front of him; Felipe Martins, Wil Trapp, DeAndre Yedlin and Shane O'Neil) for individuals that were 23 and under. He wasn't expected to start this soon and, yet, here he was already being the impact fans had hoped he'd become. Akindele hadn't even played 400 minutes to that point of the season.

At the end of the season Shipp played 600 more minutes than Akindele. It's important to realize the amount he played isn't because he was better it was because of his situation and talent in the context of his team. But when we realize that Akindele had the bulk (over 50% of his minutes) the second half the season it explains why we recall more of his moments and why most of them seem to matter more.

Okay, this isn't just me being contrarian to make a point. I agree, Akindele was the better choice for the award between him and Shipp. Akindele's expected goal impact was more significant and showed quanity and quality over what Shipp produced. Yes, Akindele did have the luxury of playing a high number of minutes at the end of the season but more importantly his actions directly influenced points.

It's a bit tongue-in-cheek to say a forward is more influential than midfielder. But a forward has more defined accomplishments (e.g. goals) making it easier to acknowledge the established events and actions that go towards helping a team win.

Akindele won this award because he was the best player. It's not because Shipp was good and then not or that Akindele didn't fade down the stretch. The two competitors were in different worlds, different scenarios and produced the bulk of their accomplishments during two different time frames of the season playing two different positions.

I personally shaded to Akindele for the simple reason that he had more tangible production (won more duels/created more expected goals) in less time than Shipp. I suppose some will argue that point and be disappointed with how I'm only looking at things on a spreadsheet.  Oh well, just the facts man, just the facts.

Looking for the value in the MVP race

By Tom Worville (@Worville)

In just over a week's time, the Volkswagen MLS MVP award will be decided. The three players in contention are Robbie Keane of the LA Galaxy, Lee Nguyen of the New England Revolution and Obafemi Martins of the Seattle Sounders. The basis of this article is to look at the stats and decide which player deserves the title of MVP.

The MVP award rewards exactly what it says on the tin: it’s an award for the most valuable player in the league. In order for a player to generate “value,” he needs to contribute on the pitch through goals, tackles, assists, etc.

It’s not necessarily purely down to goals either; Bradley Wright-­Phillips’ current total of 27 goals in 32 league games was not deemed enough to get him into the top three. To win the MVP award, you need to create value apart from goals (either that or there’s some anti­-English bias going on).

The table below shows the per-90 figures for the final trio over a variety of on-field metrics. I’ve included a small mix of attacking, defending and possession-based metrics so that the focus isn’t purely on goals scored. The data come from the regular season, in addition each player's first two games of the playoffs. The figures in bold indicate the top player in that category of the three.

Player	Nguyen	Keane	Martins
Total Team Goals	58	74	66
Guarenteed Compensation	$193,750	$4,500,000	$1,753,333
Games Played	34	31	33
Goals	0.59	0.61	0.53
Tackles	1.49	0.13	0.65
Interceptions	0.65	0.26	0.16
Pass Completion	80%	79%	72%
Blocks	0.09	0.03	0.00
Clearances	0.40	0.20	0.13
Assists	0.12	0.40	0.39
Key Passes (without assists)	2.05	1.48	1.59
Total Chances Created	2.17	1.88	1.98
% of Team Goals	34.5%	25.7%	25.8%

Keane has the highest goals per 90 of 0.61, followed by Nguyen (0.59) and Martins (0.53). This isn’t that surprising. Keane plays as the out and out striker on his team, whereas Nguyen plays as more of an attacking midfielder, occupying the space between the midfielders and the strikers.

To put this into perspective, I’ve included the percentage of total team goals each player scored. Nguyen leads the way, accounting for 35 percent of his teams goals, with Keane and Martins accounting for about 26 percent each. This highlights the Revolution’s reliance on Nguyen, as well as the need for them to sign a good quality striker to lead the line in the 2015 season.

Next up is Chance Creation. Chance Creation is made up of Key Passes (pass leading to a shot) and Assists (pass leading to a goal). It’s important to break these down as it shows what chances lead to goals and which go unfinished. Nguyen once again leads the way with 2.17 chances created per 90, followed by Martins (1.98) and Keane (1.88). But by breaking it down into assists and key passes, we get perhaps a better idea of the quality of the chances created by each player.

Note: For me the quality of a chance created depends on the ability of the player who takes the shot, as well as the position of the ball and opposition in the chance’s context. Poor finishing ability or a relatively threat-free chance location would mean a low quality shot, but passing into a lot of space in a threatening position, or to a striker who can finish would result in a high quality shot.

Assists-­wise, Keane leads the way with 0.40 assists per 90, followed by Martins (0.39) and Nguyen (0.12). For Keane and Martins this is partly because they are surrounded by such good attacking players on their respective teams. LA Galaxy have Gyasi Zardes and Landon Donovan, and the Seattle Sounders have Clint Dempsey and Lamar Neagle. For New England and Lee Nguyen, there are less threatening options as mentioned earlier. However, based on ASA's shot data, Keane also outpaced the pack with 8.48 xAssists, compared to Martins' 6.55 and Nguyen's 5.51, so maybe it's not all about quality of teammates.

Looking at pass completion, Nguyen leads with 80%, Keane next (79%) and Martins last (72%).  Strikers usually have a lower pass completion than midfielders, so this isn’t surprising, although Keane has relatively high pass completion for a striker.

Finally, looking at the per-90 defensive stats, Nguyen leads in tackles (1.49), blocks (0.09), clearances (0.4) and interceptions (0.65). It may be unfair to compare strikers to midfielders in a defensive sense, but this provides another argument in favor of Nguyen regardless. If I were choosing a candidate I’d pick Lee Nguyen in a heartbeat. Sadly it’s not up to me. l believe from reading this article you can appreciate how valuable Lee Nguyen has been on the pitch for New England.

If all the points I’ve provided aren’t enough, then take into context the wages that these players receive. I’ve used the guaranteed compensation value from the MLS Players Union’s annual release of wage data. These figures are likely to change slightly, but these are the most accurate figures available: Nguyen is going to earn $193,750, Martins $1,753,333 and Keane a huge $4,500,000. Percentage wise Nguyen cost 11% of Martins and 4% of Keane. If we’re talking about value, you can’t look past those figures.

What drove the Red Bulls late play-off push?

By Harrison Crow (@harrison_crow)

I'm going to throw a quote at you from an American Soccer Now article. Read it below then we'll talk about it and break stuff down from a data perspective. Okay,  BRB.

“I look at the tactical shift to a two defensive midfielder formation, putting Eric [Alexander] and Dax [McCarty] together, as the key to turning around our season,” Robles said. “Coming off the Supporters Shield we got off to a slow start and were trying a lot of things and there was a lot of trial and error. But by moving Eric next to Dax it resulted in fewer chances conceded while allowing our offensive juggernauts to do their thing.”

— Red Bulls Goalkeeper, Luis Robles

Luis Robles doesn't quote any stats or data here. It's more of an intellectual response in attempting to encapsulate two different points in the season. Obviously, Robles has a good frame of reference from which to put together this thought. Unfortunately it comes across more as a feeling that manifested as result of the situational outcomes.

The last 9 games of the season the Red Bulls average 2.1 points per game and were very good as a whole. This was also a much needed improvement upon heir 1.24 points per game they average the first 25 matches this season. It begs the question was this accurate line of thinking by Robles and did the Red Bulls really get that much better from a shot perspective or was it a swing in luck?

I'm not trying to specifically get into the nitty-gritty of the tactics to determine whether McCarty or Alexander directly influenced shot creation or allowance. The point of this exercise isn't to get that granular, but to look at the shots from a general perspective. Looking for indications of how the Red Bulls turn around came about.

Robles mentions that he felt they conceded fewer shots a game and author Brooke Tunstall back that point referencing Robles made less saves on average during those 9 matches. That doesn't really mean that they took less shots. What's the difference? Well, luck is the difference. Shots on target are a subset of the greater whole in the sense that it only shows you a small picture of the attempts to score.

Logic would tell you that just because the opposing team didn't put a shot on target doesn't mean they shouldn't have scored a goal or that they didn't create a dangerous opportunity. It just means they lacked in execution of the final component of scoring a goal, getting it on frame. Albeit a very important detail, just not the only detail to note.

Below is a quick synopsis of shots before September 6th and then the few following along with some aggregate data.

You can see that there are a few differences of note that occur before September 6th and then again after. Let's take a look at this snap shot and discuss three specific things from it.

Slow start: Red Bulls attack was good, defense not so much

There are a lot of things that you can say about the Red Bulls start at the beginning of the season. Chalk it up to personnel or to bad luck or even just bad coaching decisions. Whatever, dealers choice. You just might as well sum it up as not being good. That is magnified all the more by the fact they over performed in the expected goals metric. Unfortunately for them, they shot themselves in the foot with how many opportunities they in turn gave their opponent.

You can't expect good results when you give your opponent that type of advantage. It doesn't work in your favor and this is exactly how we would have expected it playing out.

It's easy to pander to the narrative that New York was simply unlucky in the first half. It's actually even a bit convenient in this situation with trying to explain the last minute "jolt" they received an effort to make the play-offs. The thing about that is that luck wasn't really involved, it was simply about the amount of volume they were allowing to be shot at their own goal. That's just not playing good.

Red Bulls got a bit crazy in their final nine games.

They scored 16 goals in their final 9 games and out produced their expected outcome (13.97) by two whole goals. They did this upon an average of 1.552 expected goals per game a slight increase upon their first 25 game total (1.521).

Looking at the expected goals with shot totals can give us a rough idea of the average shot placement on the pitch. Which indicates they were still firing from pretty much the same places as they were earlier in the season just scoring more frequently than before.

The result of the shots being converted so frequently could mean either one of two things in my mind. It could be positive regression to the mean. This would be assuming that the players who were taking the largest portion of the shots the first 25 matches had finishing that was performing below their skill level. Or, and I feel this is more likely the case, the Red Bulls just got lucky in a situation where they needed it.

Luck isn't a bad word

Yes, so there was likely some luck involved in how they found their goals. That isn't suppose to undercut the performance of either Bradley Wright-Phillips or Thierry Henry. Both had great seasons and it's arguable that if it wasn't for one or even both that the season could have been much, much worse. Great strikers have a habit of out producing their expected goal. Now, that's not always the case but in this situation it was. Wright-Phillips scored 4 more goals than what we projected for him and Henry was good for an extra two goals himself. That's an additional six goals and some of that is luck but certainly there is another portion that comes from their skill.

 

Red Bulls reduced the attacks at their goal. 

It wasn't just that Luis Robles saved less shots on average in those nine games. Teams were giving him less chances to make those saves. The defense stepped up in a big way by reducing the volume of shots being sprayed at Robles' net. By proxy this lowered the average expected goals by their opponents. Is this the foot print of Alexander and McCarty? It's very possible, and taking it a step further I think that Robles portrayed the Red Bulls turn around very accurately.

---

The luck in attack and the corralling of opponents shots is exactly what helped propel the Red Bulls to big wins. The question going forward is whether or not they can continue to do it against New England. With Jermaine Jones roving both ways, the creativity of Lee Nguyen and the playoff resurgence of Charlie Davies.

The Red Bulls still have a real challenge ahead of them and while it's clear that they have the pieces that can slow down defenses and throw up goals on the score board. The transformation is complete, the question is can it get the Red Bulls to an MLS Cup? And if so, could they win it? Many questions and only two matches for answers.