ASA Podcast - XXXI: The One Where We Talk MLS Cup

MLS Cup, if you hadn't heard, is this weekend and the World Cup draw today (11:30 EST, ESPN) there is a bit to talk about this week on the podcast. We go over the probabilities of the draw and how that works and then we break down both RSL and Sporting KC in this weekends Cup Finale. Have a listen, I'm sure you'll enjoy. [audio http://americansocceranalysis.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/asa-podcast-e28093-xxxi_-the-one-where-we.mp3]

Sporting exceptional at home; RSL lame on the road

It is true that Sporting has had trouble getting points at home. SKC earned 30 points at Sporting Park this year, good for 13th in a league of 19 teams. Based on that information alone, some will argue that Sporting is not a good home team. One of those people is Simon Borg, who justifies his viewpoint by pointing out that SKC lost five times at home, as though that matters. It doesn't.

I've shown that past points simply don't correlate well to future points. With information like shot ratios and expected goal differentials (xGD), points are essentially a meaningless indicator of team ability---or at the very least, a meaningless predictor. I see "predictor" and "indicator" as near-synonyms in this instance, but you may not. Regardless, Sporting's home points total should not even be considered in the discussion of who will win on Saturday. Why not? In addition to out-shooting its opponents in every single home game this season, here is how SKC did relative to the league in xGD this season:

Team GF GA GD xGF xGA xGD "Luck"
LA 32 8 24 32.1 11.0 21.1 2.9
SKC 29 15 14 28.7 11.6 17.1 -3.1
PHI 23 17 6 28.8 16.0 12.8 -6.8
NYRB 32 15 17 26.8 15.4 11.4 5.6
SEA 28 15 13 26.5 15.6 10.9 2.1
COL 28 16 12 25.3 14.5 10.7 1.3
HOU 23 16 7 28.0 18.9 9.1 -2.1
RSL 31 16 15 24.6 16.4 8.2 6.8
CHI 28 19 9 27.0 19.4 7.6 1.4
SJ 23 13 10 28.8 21.2 7.6 2.4
POR 28 11 17 23.9 16.6 7.2 9.8
CLB 19 13 6 25.6 18.8 6.8 -0.8
NE 29 15 14 22.2 17.4 4.8 9.2
MTL 31 19 12 25.1 20.5 4.6 7.4
FCD 28 21 7 24.2 19.8 4.4 2.6
VAN 32 18 14 23.7 19.5 4.2 9.8
DCU 16 27 -11 23.5 21.3 2.2 -13.2
TOR 22 21 1 18.5 19.1 -0.6 1.6
CHV 16 28 -12 18.9 26.0 -7.1 -4.9

SKC has a decent goal differential at home, but more importantly, it has the second-best expected goal differential at home. xGD is an excellent predictor of future success, and a better indication in my mind of true team skill.

Borg goes on to talk about the "road warriors" from Salt Lake City:

"They love playing on the road. Playing at home is too much pressure; they do it better when they're away from home."

No team is better on the road than at home, but whatever. RSL did tie for third in MLS this season with 22 away points earned, but again, we don't care. RSL out-shot it opponents in just five of 17 road games (29.4%), and, well this:

Team GF GA GD xGF xGA xGD "Luck"
SKC 16 15 1 19.3 18.2 1.1 -0.1
SJ 11 29 -18 20.5 21.3 -0.8 -17.2
LA 20 30 -10 18.5 20.2 -1.7 -8.3
FCD 18 28 -10 19.9 23.6 -3.7 -6.3
HOU 17 23 -6 21.7 25.4 -3.8 -2.2
POR 25 22 3 18.9 23.5 -4.6 7.6
COL 15 22 -7 19.9 24.9 -5.1 -1.9
NYRB 24 24 0 19.5 25.6 -6.1 6.1
PHI 19 26 -7 19.4 26.7 -7.3 0.3
NE 19 21 -2 16.1 23.7 -7.6 5.6
CLB 22 33 -11 17.1 26.0 -8.9 -2.1
SEA 11 27 -16 17.9 27.2 -9.4 -6.6
CHI 18 30 -12 20.5 30.0 -9.5 -2.5
MTL 19 29 -10 16.1 26.0 -9.9 -0.1
VAN 21 23 -2 16.6 27.7 -11.0 9.0
TOR 6 25 -19 15.9 27.3 -11.4 -7.6
RSL 25 25 0 17.4 29.7 -12.3 12.3
DCU 5 28 -23 11.9 26.2 -14.3 -8.7
CHV 12 38 -26 12.0 28.9 -16.9 -9.1

Real Salt Lake finished 17th in the league in expected goal differential on the road. Ouch. The fact that their actual goal differential was tied for third in MLS means very little, since xGD makes for a much better Nostradamus.

Unless expected goal differential completely falls apart in home-away splits---which is not likely---we can conclude that Sporting is a good home team, and RSL is a bad away team.

Our current model gives Sporting 72 percent probability of a win. An xGD model---which we don't use yet because we only have one season of data---increases those chances to 88 percent. There is a lot of evidence that Sporting is the better team, and that home field advantage still applies to them. Regardless of Saturday's outcome, those two statements are still well supported.

*Note that these goal statistics do not include own goals, which is why my figures may differ slightly from those found at other sites. 

MLS Cup: Sporting KC vs. Real Salt Lake...It's Finally Here

I wish I could write this long-winded and amazingly-thought-out post. This just won't be the case. I'm mostly missing the vocabulary to mark the occasion of the biggest match of the American soccer season. Without really prolonging the post or trying to set it up by way of a specific perspective: I was digging around through Squawka and Whoscored data in preparation for tonight's podcast and found some things that I thought were interesting, and I thought that I would share them with you. First thought: Sporting Kansas City pretty much owns the defensive metric counting stats that are available to us, as well as those that I took the time to put together. They rank first in defensive actions recorded, which is simply blocked shots, interceptions and clearances. There isn't anything that I've seen or read that correlates any of these numbers to being a successful team in terms of collecting points.

That being said, it's reasonable to suspect that their ability to prevent shots and produce them at a higher ratio has something to do with these defensive statistics. I personally would associate SKC's shot ratios with two specific abilities : their possession---which we will get in first---and then prevention.

Possession doesn't tell us whether or not a club is successful, but we have mentioned that it mostly just explains how they going about being successful. Sure, a lot of people take it that when a team is holding onto the ball, that reduces its own opportunities to score. That doesn't mean that they aren't reducing their opponents' opportunities, though. In fact a club that holds on to the ball and makes a lot of successful passes does exactly that.

However, that doesn't necessarily mean they are good at defense or preventing the opposition from generating shots. It just means that they might potentially reduce the number of chances that an opposing team gets. Again, that doesn't necessarily correlate to earning points, but that does lead to us to the topic of prevention. Sporting is dominant in MLS with intercepting and clearing balls from their attacking third. Controlling possession 58% of the time at home and completing 81% of their passes, they are mitigating opponents' opportunities, and the same can be said with clearing balls off the backline and preventing the ball from coming into the attacking third at all.

Clearing the ball obviously presents the chance that the open play becomes "reset". That the pressure applied by the opposing attack has to reposition themselves in an manner that would create another chance against the goal. Sometimes that happens quickly sometimes it leads to a turnover in possession.

I'd really like to know the percentage of how many times a team got the ball into the final third and then created a shot. I suspect that Sporting Kansas City isn't necessarily any better than any other team at actually stopping a team from creating chances once they get into the attacking third. Possibly it just limits those entries.

However, if a team isn't getting many opportunities to possess the ball, and their chances of breaking into the attacking third are repelled by clearances, it has to limit the creation of shots. This is my theory on how Sporting KC has produced that positive shot ratio and why their defensive counting stats matter. I don't really know if any of it actually holds up.

Second Thought: Real Salt Lake is basically the best litmus test for this theory. A club that has superior passing talent, that also maintains the ability to possess the ball, and doesn't inadvertently turn it over with the frequency that others do.

Again, for like the thousandth time, this doesn't relate to obtaining points. However, it maybe the specific method they go about for shot creation which does lend itself as predictor. Creating shots is the name of the game, and RSL is one of the better road teams in MLS who matches up well with SKC in that regard.

If SKC's deterrence method for shots is more about mitigation of possession to specific areas of the pitch which potentially lends itself to preventing shots, then the counter is that RSL is third in away goals from outside the box with 4 converted shots by way of 74 shots.

RSL is one of the better teams at converting from distance---and while that could be as much by the way of luck as it could be by the talent of the line-ups they've fielded---the importance of this is that they aren't afraid of taking attempts from distance, and that maybe one of the best ways for them to manage a goal against SKC.

That leads into this final thought:

Looking at shots, it's a duh statement to say that SKC creates a lot of them. Unfortunately for Real Salt Lake, Sporting creates even more at home than what it normally creates on the road. What is more surprising, though, is that of those shots, the majority come from outside of the 18 yard box.

Why would it matter if a team creates more shots from a far than closer to the box? The obvious answer is that it decreases the probability of a goal scoring opportunity. Taking shots is important, regardless of where it's taken from. Without the shot there is a lack possibility that the ball actually goes into the back of the net...well, unless you are D.C. United and the rest of the league leads your team in goals scored.

I certainly approve of most shots because they creates chances. A shot that is parried or even deflected back into a crowd is another chance, a better chance, to score a goal. The problem is when you take a shot you are also conceding possession, as well as position in the attacking third. Better position equates to a higher possibility of a scoring chance and ultimately that's what your trying to do: increase the odds of scoring a goal. Despite taking 164 shots from outside the box at home, Sporting only scored 5 goals, opposed to 29 goals from 105 shots inside the box.

Taking shots from better locations is going to improve your odds, but it's more than that. It's about finding the opportunity to win games. Saturday will simply be about finding those moments, finishing them and then, hopefully, winning.

Both teams have remarkable similarities and they both possess the ability to expose the others weaknesses. This has the potential to be one of the best MLS Cups in recent memory. That isn't to say that LA and Houston pounding on each other hasn't been somewhat entertaining.

But SKC and RSL bring to the table a style of soccer that is pleasing to watch, and each procures shots---which is one of the biggest complaints from people who are infrequent viewers. It also will, hopefully, attract some of those individuals who usually are less inclined to watch American soccer, relegating themselves to the European versions.

Here is just hoping the game is just interesting.

ASA Podcast XXX: The One Where We Talk Conference Finals

Happy Thanksgiving, all! We have a Conference Finals-centric podcast concerning the outcomes this past weekend's matches. Also, there was a little discussion that came out of it concerning formations vs. personnel. It's just us talking and coming up some random thoughts. It's not that long, but it's us and we're having a good chat... I think Matty at one point insults Sebastián Velásquez's hair cut, so there is that. [audio http://americansocceranalysis.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/asa-podcast-xxx_-the-one-where-we-ta.mp3]

Does last season matter?

We've shown time and time again how helpful a team's shot rates are in projecting how well that team is likely to do going forward. To this point, however, data has always been contained in-season, ignoring what teams did in past seasons. Since most teams keep large percentages of their personnel, it's worth looking into the predictive power of last season. We don't currently have shot locations for previous seasons, but we do have general shot data going back to 2011. This means that I can look at all the 2012 and 2013 teams, and how important their 2011 and 2012 seasons were, respectively. Here goes.

First, I split each of the 2012 and 2013 seasons into two halves, calculating stats from each half. Let's start by leaving out the previous season's data. Here is the predictive power of shot rates and finishing rates, where the response variable is second-half goal differential.

Stat

Coefficient

P-value

Intercept

-28.36792

0.04%

Attempt Diff (first 17)

0.14244

0.00%

Finishing Diff (first 17)

77.06047

1.18%

Home Remaining

3.37472

0.03%

To summarize, I used total shot attempt differential and finishing rate differential from the first 17 games to predict the goal differential for each team in the final 17 games. Also, I controlled for how many home games each team had remaining. The sample size here is the 56 team-seasons from 2011 through 2013. All three variables are significant in the model, though the individual slopes should be interpreted carefully.*

The residual standard error for this model is high at 6.4 goals of differential. Soccer is random, and predicting exact goal differentials is impossible, but that doesn't mean this regression is worthless. The R-squared value is 0.574, though as James Grayson has pointed out to me, the square root of that figure (0.757) makes more intuitive sense. One might say that we are capable of explaining 57.4 percent of the variance in second-half goal differentials, or 75.7 percent of the standard deviation (sort of). Either way, we're explaining something, and that's cool.

But we're here to talk about the effects of last season, so without further mumbo jumbo, the results of a more-involved linear regression:

Stat

Coefficient

P-value

Intercept

-31.3994

1.59%

Attempt Diff (first 17)

0.12426

0.03%

Attempt Diff (last season)

0.02144

28.03%

Finishing Diff (first 17)

93.27359

1.14%

Finishing Diff (last season)

72.69412

12.09%

Home Remaining

3.71992

1.53%

Now we've added teams' shot and finishing differentials from the previous season. Obviously, I had to cut out the 2011 data (since 2010 is not available to me currently), as well as Montreal's 2012 season (since they made no Impact in 2011**). This left me with a sample size of 37 teams. Though the residual standard error was a little higher at 6.6 goals, the regression now explained 65.2 percent of the variance in second-half goal differential. Larger sample sizes would be nice, and I'll work on that, but for now it seems that---even halfway through a season---the previous season's data may improve the projection, especially when it comes to finishing rates.

But what about projecting outcomes for, say, a team's fourth game of the season? Using its rates from just three games of the current season would lead to shaky projections at best. I theorize that, as a season progresses, the current season's data get more and more important for the prediction, while the previous season's data become relatively less important.

My results were most assuredly inconclusive, but leaned in a rather strange direction. The previous season's shot data was seemingly more helpful in predicting outcomes during the second half of the season than it was in the first half---except, of course, the first few weeks of the season. Specifically, the previous season's shot data was more helpful for predicting games from weeks 21 to 35 than  it was from weeks 6 to 20. This was true for finishing rates, as well, and led me to recheck my data. The data was errorless, and now I'm left to explain why information from a team's previous season helps project game outcomes in the second half of the current season better than the first half.

Anybody want to take a look? Here are the results of some logistic regression models. Note that the coefficients represent the estimated change in (natural) log odds of a home victory.

 Weeks 6 - 20

Coefficient

P-value

Intercept

0.052

67.36%

Home Shot Diff

0.139

0.35%

H Shot Diff (previous)

-0.073

29.30%

Away Shot Diff

-0.079

7.61%

A Shot Diff (previous)

-0.052

47.09%

Weeks 21 - 35

Coefficient

P-value

Intercept

0.036

78.94%

Home Shot Diff

0.087

19.37%

H Shot Diff (previous)

0.181

6.01%

Away Shot Diff

-0.096

15.78%

A Shot Diff (previous)

-0.181

4.85%

Later on in the season, during weeks 21 to 35, the previous season's data actually appears to become more important to the prediction than the current season's data---both in statistical significance and actual significance. This despite the current season's shot data being based on an ample sample of at least 19 games (depending on the specific match in the data set). So I guess I'm comfortable saying that last season matters, but I'm still confused---a condition I face daily.

*The model suggests that each additional home game remaining projects a three-goal improvement in differential (3.37, actually). In a vacuum, that makes no sense. However, we are not vacuuming. Teams that have more home games remaining have also played a tougher schedule. Thus the +3.37 coefficient for each additional home game remaining is also adjusting the projection for teams who's shot rates are suffering due to playing on the road more frequently. 

**Drew hates me right now.

ASA Podcast XXIX: The International Break And All That Garbage

Hey, guys... we're back with better audio quality this week. A big thanks to Drew who put things together last week in my place, and despite technology failing apart around them, Drew and Matty were able to put together a great podcast. This week on the show we tackle MLS playoffs, CONCACAF and USMNT dealings and then some Transfers/Loan rumors that are out there. It's a longer podcast, but it'd been a few weeks since we all got together, and things just rolled. I hope you enjoy it.

[audio http://americansocceranalysis.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/29-asa-podcast-xxix_-the-internation.mp3]

MVP Discussion: Soccer shares baseball's issues

In the wake of Major League Baseball awarding its MVP to Miguel Cabrera, debates over what "valuable" means have once again flared up. Though soccer and baseball are two incredibly different sports, I think we can apply some of the same logic to both MVP discussions. Major League Soccer has about two weeks remaining before its MVP award is handed out, and we will no doubt encounter many of the same controversies in the soccer blogosphere that appear in baseball every season. The MVP controversy usually begins with what "valuable" means. I think there's little doubt in most people's minds that "valuable" and "skilled" are correlated. The main controversy is how correlated. To some, asking who was the best player in Major League Soccer in 2013 would be equivalent to asking who was the most valuable to his team. To others, there would be some key distinctions, the most common of which is that MVPs must come from teams that reach the post season.

In retort to that thinking, some very astute commenters in a Fangraphs.com forum offered up these nuggets. Hendu for Kutch made the analogy:

"We each want to buy something that costs $1. I’ve got a quarter, 8 nickels, and 10 pennies. My 'team' of coins is worth 75 cents and falls short of being able to buy the item. You have one dime and 18 nickels. Your 'team' is worth $1, and you successfully buy the item. Is your dime more valuable than my quarter simply because it led to a successful item purchase?"

Mike Trout = quarter and Miguel Cabrera = dime, for those of you not so into baseball, and the question is a good one. Few would argue that the dime is more valuable than the quarter just because it found itself in a position to help buy that scrumptious Twix.

In reply to someone arguing that the quarter had no value because it didn't lead to the purchase of a desired item, BIP and ndavis910 then chimed in:

"Except not everything costs $1, and at any rate, you would always choose the quarter over the dime when accumulating money for a purchase."

"Especially when you don’t know the cost of the items until you get to the store. In baseball, a team cannot be sure how many wins it will take to reach the playoffs until the last day of the season. In your example, the quarter is the most valuable piece regardless of whether or not the item cost $1 or $0.75."

When thinking about attributing value to players like Marco Di Vaio, Mike Magee, Camilo Sanvezzo, Robbie Keane and company, why should it matter where their teams finished? If one believes that Magee, for instance, is the best player in MLS, then does it matter if he took his team from 39 points to 49, versus from 40 points to 50? Either way, it's still ten points of value in the standings. When Magee was traded to Chicago, neither Chicago nor Magee knew that the Fire was going to need 50 points to make the playoffs. The fact that they got just 49 points shouldn't negate any of Magee's value.

If you say that it matters because MLS clubs get real value from extra playoff games, then think about this. Playoff cutoff lines are quite arbitrary. If MLS allowed only the top two teams in from each conference---not completely unreasonable for a league of just 19 teams---then none of the players mentioned above would be considered under this playoffs requirement. Playoffs represent an arbitrary bar that the players competing for the award don't get to set, and while reaching the playoffs does bring the team measurable revenue and value, basing an award on something outside an individual's control would, in my opinion, strip the award of its intended meaning and purpose.

Now let's anticipate the logical counterargument---that players pick up their games in playoff races and play well when it matters most.

For a moment, let's ignore the fact that little evidence has ever been found in professional sports that players can turn it on and turn it off as needed. This past season, Magee scored seven goals in Chicago's final nine games, a stretch in which the team averaged 1.56 points per match. That represents a pace that would have gotten the Fire into the playoffs if maintained for the entire season. Di Vaio scored five goals in his last 10 games---I even included that tenth-to-last game in which he scored two goals---in a stretch where Montreal tallied just 0.7 points per match, limping into the playoffs on a tie-breaker with Chicago. Just because one team makes the playoffs doesn't mean its best player was at his peak when it mattered. Goals are, admittedly, a narrow-minded way to measure a striker's value, but I think the point is still valid.

For me, the Magee-Di Vaio example above may have been no more than an exercise in confirmation bias. I chose to see what I already believed. However, the logic behind the belief that team standings shouldn't matter to players' MVP merits is still good stuff, and transcends any biased example I can come up with.

If we're ready to agree that that the MVP award should essentially be given to the best overall player, then we still have a tall task ahead of us. How do we measure skill on the soccer field? That is the 64,000-dollar question, and one we hope to help tackle here at ASA some day. But perhaps it's not so crazy to think that a guy like Federico Higuain is deserving of the MVP award. If you scoff at that notion, you likely do so because you've been trained to think about MVP awards in a certain way.

We're all about re-thinking things around here.

ASA Podcast XXIX: Of flip phones, semifinals, USMNT, pass completions, and burrito folding.

This week we talked about how cool and hip we are, followed by a discussion of the first legs of the MLS Cup semifinals. We continued with potential changes to MLS' CONCACAF Champions League births, Klinsmann's 23 man roster for the upcoming friendlies versus Scotland and Austria, and the top 50 players in MLS by pass completion percentage. We concluded with a discussion of burritos and proper burrito folding practices. [audio http://americansocceranalysis.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/episode-xxix.mp3]

Game of the Week: Real Salt Lake vs. Portland Timbers

A look at the 4-2 scoreline may give the appearance that Real Salt Lake shredded Portland's defense in an wide-open free-for-all. On the contrary, two of RSL's goals came directly from corner kicks, while a third was courtesy of the generosity and stone touch of Futty Danso (who was also marking Schuler on RSL's first goal). Credit should of course go to Salt Lake for piling on the pressure, but what really characterized Real Salt Lake's play on Sunday was not a free-flowing attack, but rather excellent team defense and a commitment to attacking via the flanks. No Space for Portland

Throughout the match, Real Salt Lake's defensive shape remained resolute, and never came close to being broken down by Portland's 4-3-3. Kyle Beckerman was, as ever, the linchpin of RSL's midfield, leading the team in aerial duels won with 6 (of 7) and tackles (4, tied with Tony Beltran), and contributing 6 clearances. However, the incessant pressure of Sebastian Velazquez and Luis Gil—who it should be noted are 19 and 22 years old, respectively—along with the fullback pairing of Beltran (who led RSL in touches with 76) and Chris Wingert/Lovel Palmer, never allowed any space for Diego Valeri or Darlington Nagbe to work their magic in the midfield. Many of Portland's forays into the penalty area stemmed from Rodney Wallace collecting the ball in wide positions and sending in listless crosses (0-for-6) that were easily dealt with by Nat Borchers. Forward Ryan Johnson was kept in check all game, limited to a mere 18 touches in his 59 minutes on the field.

The entirety of Portland's productive offensive output consisted of Will Johnson's free kick goal, Piquionne's soaring headed goal, and a 77th minute shot from Alhassan after a slick dribbling spell through the heart of RSL's midfield. For the entire game, Portland had only two successful dribbles and three successful crosses in the attacking third (one of which was Jewsbury's beautiful assist).

Defending from the Front

The only change in the starting lineup for Real Salt Lake to start the game was Devon Sandoval replacing an ailing Alvaro Saborio. While few would argue that Sandoval is the better player, his kinetic style, defensive workrate, and ability to get into wide spaces provided problems for the Great Wall of Gambia.

Chalkboards of Devon Sandoval vs. Portland (left) and Alvaro Saborio vs. Los Angeles (right)

RSLvPor-11-11-Sandoval RSLvLA-11-07-Saborio

As you can see, the defense starts from the front. Sandoval pressured wide all game long, trying to disrupt Portland's rhythm in the defensive half of the field. Of Sandoval's 43 actions against Portland, only 11 (25.6%) took place in the center third of the field, compared to 15 of 28 (53.6%) for Saborio against Los Angeles. Sandoval also pressured back more than Saborio did: 8 of 43 (18.6%) actions by Sandoval took place in RSL's half of the field, compared to a meager 2 of 28 for Saborio (7.1%).

Stretching the Diamond

What really stuck out about the way that Real Salt Lake played, however, was the way that their midfield “diamond” stretched from touchline-to-touchline, with Velazquez manning the left, Gil hugging the right, and Morales drifting from side-to-side, looking for an inch of space wherever he could find it.

Here is a chalkboard of passes attempted by Real Salt Lake, along with the percentage of passes attempted from each section of the field:

RSLvPOR-11-11-RSLBallPossessionAreas     RSLvPOR-RSLPossessionNinthed

And here are all of the passes attempted by Portland, along with the percentage breakdown:

RSLvPOR-11-11-PORBallPossessionAreas     RSLvPOR-PORPossessionNinthed

Real Salt Lake attempted only 13.6% of their passes from the central attacking portions of the field, while 64.3% of their passes came from the wide attacking areas. Portland, by contrast, attempted 18.9% of their passes from the central areas, and 58.6% of their passes coming from the wide attacking zones.

RSL ratio of wide-attacking passes to central-attacking passes: 4.73-to-1 POR ratio of wide-attacking passes to central-attacking passes: 3.10-to-1

Real Salt Lake took their chances against Portland's flank defense rather than try to fight through Will Johnson and Diego Chara. The gambit worked well, as all eight of RSL's key passes and assists came from wide positions.

Three questions for leg 2 in Portland:

1. Will Saborio be healthy? If so, Sandoval will likely see the bench again as Findley's speed will serve as an outlet against a high-pressing, possibly desperate Timbers squad, unless...

2. Kreis opts for the 4-2-3-1? Beckerman and Yordany Alvarez were deployed in a double pivot at Los Angeles a few weeks ago, and while the results were not exactly convincing, it perhaps implies (or at least I'm inferring) that Kreis may want to take a more conservative approach on the road in the playoffs.

3. Ryan Johnson or Frederic Piquionne? Ryan Johnson has put in a workmanlike effort thus far in the playoffs, but with his playing time diminishing each game (83 min @ SEA, 69 min v SEA, 59 min @ RSL) and Piquionne finally healthy (and able to leap clear over Nat Borchers), it may be time for Piquionne to crack the starting lineup.

What Piquionne's goal means to Portland

Though our game states data set doesn't yet include all of 2013, it still includes 137 games. In those 137 games, only five home teams ever went down three goals, and all five teams lost. There were 24 games in which the home team went down two goals, with only one winner (4.2%) and five ties (20.8%). The sample of two-goal games perhaps gives a little hope to the Timbers, but these small sample sizes lend themselves to large margins of error. It is also important to note that teams that go down two goals at home tend to be bad teams---like Chivas USA, which litters that particular data set. None of the five teams that ever went down three goals at home made the playoffs this year. Only seven of the 24 teams to go down two goals at home made it to the playoffs. Portland is a good team. Depending on your model of preference, the Timbers are somewhere in the top eight. So even if those probabilities up there hypothetically had small margins of error, they still wouldn't necessarily apply to the Timbers.

Oh, and while we're talking about extra variables, in those games the teams had less time to come back. To work around these confounding variables, I consulted a couple models, and I controlled for team ability using our expected goal differential. Here's what I found.

A logistic model suggests that, for each goal of deficit early in a match, the odds of winning are reduced by a factor of  about two or three. A tie, though, would also allow Portland to play on. A home team's chances winning or tying fall from about 75 percent in a typical game that begins zero-zero, to about 25 percent being down two goals. Down three goals, and that probability plummets to less than 10 percent. But using this particular logistic regression was dangerous, as I was forced to extrapolate for situations that never happen during the regular season---starting a game from behind.

So I went to a linear model. The linear model expects Portland to win by about 0.4 goals. 15.5 percent of home teams in our model were able to perform at least 1.6 goals above expectation, what the Timbers would need to at least force a draw in regulation. Only 4.6 percent of teams performed 2.6 goals above expectation. If we just compromise between what the two models are telling us, then the Timbers probably have about a 20-percent chance to pull off a draw in regulation. That probability would have been closer to five percent had Piquionne not finished a beautiful header in stoppage time.